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Introduction
Why would a corporate manager not want to improve his or her company's corporate governance? For decades, a "canon" of corporate governance reforms, epitomised by the OECD (2015) Principles of Corporate Governance, has dominated thinking about the most value-adding ways to improve corporate governance. Follow these rules and shareholder value will grow. But does it? Especially in emerging markets like China? For decades, scholars like Bai et al. (2004) have tried to quantify the gains from "better" corporate governance in China (with better in quotes because most academics can not agree on what better means in the Chinese context). Yet, using their revenues, profits, or even local stock markets as a gauge of such value suffers from noise like economic slow-downs, individuals' policies, and so forth. What if we look at the data available, both from fancy mathematically driven models and from a raw view of the data...from a controlled, calm place like Hong Kong? Would Mainland companies, with better corporate governance practices, share valuations change differently than those companies with practices that do not follow the OECD canon? What about companies implementing reforms broader than the canon?
We find that Chinese companies adopting the corporate governance canon -as measured by compliance with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's Code of Corporate Governance -earn 7% higher returns than those that do not. Such a policy change could increase shareholder value by more than $330 billion. The first part of this paper reviews previous works, most finding that better corporate governance pays-off in terms of share holder returns. The second part looks at the effect on Chinese companies' valuations when they "import" foreign corporate governance rules by listing abroad. These studies generally find that such an import correlates with higher share prices. The third part provides yet another confirmation -using a differences-in-differences methodology to estimate the value of the canon. Namely, using Mainland firms listed in China as a baseline, we look at the effects of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's Code of Corporate Governance on Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2012. The final section concludes.
We should highlight some caveats before we begin. First, we spend more time reviewing other studies in-depth in order to provide the reason with the intuitions needed for understanding our own results. We do not provide a perfunctory literature review, getting it out of the way in order to move on to the good stuff. Our review of past studies represents the good stuff that readers will need to form deeper intuitions driving our own results. Second, and similarly, our multidisciplinary paper does not follow the usual path of model building and using the econometric methods in vogue at the time. We purposely keep our analysis descriptive -following the critical school's criticism in the social sciences that heavy econometrics molds the results and obscures the results (Zachariadis and co-authors, 2010; Izurieta, 2017) . We do not follow the usual mould of publishable papers. We hope the reader finds this approach a useful example of post-crisis economics. Third, and again consistent with this approach, we do not try to analyse our mean or distribution using fancy econometric tools. Because the evidence about whether corporate governance positively or negatively affects share prices remains so murky, even a simple, robust conclusion like ours contributes to the din. Simply put, we can not believe no one has done this kind of differences-in-differences before.
Reviewing the Link between Chinese Corporate Governance and Investor Returns
How do we know that 'better' corporate governance practices among Chinese firms contribute to higher corporate returns? Figure 1 shows the results of simplistic (and wrong) Yet, more credible studies do find a relationship between Chinese firms' corporate governance index values market valuations. Even before looking at these studies, Figure 2 shows an unmistakable relationship between the quality of Mainland companies' corporate governance and their Tobins' q. 1 The line of best fit seems to show that a one-point increase in corporate governance indicators correlates with a 1 point change in Tobin's q values. Figure 3 shows very similar findings -with changes in market valuations (namely Tobin's q) corresponding to changes in Chinese firms' corporate governance index values. As firms move from the 'worst' to the 'best' corporate governance practices (and we stop putting these subjective judgements in quotes), they add the extra value of the replacement cost of their assets. By way of illustrating the magnitude of these findings, if all Mainland listed companies moved from worst to best-in-class corporate governance, such a move would add about $2.7 trillion in market capitalization to these firms (see figure for methodology used to find this number). As Cheung and co-authors (2010) show, Mainland firms with better corporate governance list abroad and have higher levels of disclosure (and accompanying levels of market value). Cheung and other co-authors (2007) Numerous studies show the types of corporate governance relations correlating with higher market valuations. Figure 4 shows an example from recent studies looking at the econometric relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. After controlling for other variables like market conditions, they find that foreign and institutional ownership, dispersed shareholding, effective boards and audit committees, help lift firm values. Most studies confirm Bai et al.'s (2004) 
Figure 4: Investors Clearly Pay Premiums for Good Corporate Governance in China
The data show the relationship betw een several indicators related to Chinese firms' corporate governance and their performance (as measured by Tobin's q or market premium over book value) and return on assets. The data show stronger relationships betw een share price mark-ups and corporate governance (after accounting for factors like these firms' asset sizes, leverage and grow th rates) --than for returns on assets. Yet, models of Tobin's q generally have low explanatory pow er (as represented by the tiny R-squared or variance explained). Source: Lee and Zhang (2011) Tobin's q side RoA side 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5
Better corporate governance (as commonly defined) has other advantages which indirectly promote market valuations. 3 One way consists of helping to reduce the fraud and the self-dealing which makes investors nervous about investing in Mainland shares. 4 Examples range from Ming Zhao of Puda Coal, ZTE's circumvention of export restrictions to Iran, and the Bank of China's refusal to turn over customer information in a counterfeiting case (Harris, 2016) . Academics have quantified the harm such fraud reeks on share prices and demand for Chinese shares.
5 More specifically, Chen and Zhang (2012) find similarly for the 2002 Chinese Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies' effect on earnings manipulation. In their econometric study, they find that the Code curbed earnings management by requiring independent non-executive board directors and audit committees staffed with accounting/financial experts. Firth and coauthors (2011) find that the quality of Chinese corporate governance directly affects the "occurrence and detection of financial fraud." Figure 5 shows the effect that corporate governance has on auditor choice -and thus the likelihood of getting away with bad governance behaviour. Lo and colleagues (2010) reach similar conclusions -conducting econometric analysis on transfer price manipulations. As a result, investors needed larger premia to buy shares in companies with poorer corporate governance (Yeh and co-authors, 2009 ). Thus, better Chinese corporate governance indubitably leads to higher share values. What about simply listing on a foreign exchange? Should/can the Mainland import (or bond) foreign corporate governance to their domestic operations? Guo and co-authors (2013) show that a foreign listing -specifically a Hong Kong listing -can increase the market value of Mainland companies by literally hundreds of percentage points. Other data from authors like Klautzer (2013) show that openness encourages the corporate governance reform that eventually impacts on profits and market valuations. Zhou and co-authors (2011) show that a foreign listing in Hong Kong statistically significantly correlates with increases in Mainland firms' returns on assets, board control, and board characteristics conforming to the corporate governance canon. 6 Figure  6 shows the estimated premium for Mainland companies earned by listing in Hong Kong (and 6 Specifically "board characteristics" consists of proxies for the presence of foreign directors, the Board's international experience, the establishment of professional committees, board size, number of boards, proportion of independent directors, separation of chairman from general manager, and annual chairman changes. "Board control behavior" consists of attendance rates of independent directors, overall board attendance, independent directors' objections, rate of independent directors, performance review of the board, stock incentive mechanisms, the number of shareholders at general meetings, the number of extraordinary shareholder meetings, disclosure of business goals/ conditions and vision, the implementation of board resolutions, professionalism of committees' reports, number of institutional investors, and the equity ratio of the company's first major shareholders. See source for more details on the construction of these variables. 
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Jilin Chemical Industrial Jingwei Textile Machinery Nanjing Panda Electronic Beiren Printing Machinery Dongfang Electrical Machinery Luoyang Glass 700%-800% Shandong Xinhua Pharma The figure shows the premia for dual-listed shares (on the Hong Kong and Mainland exchanges) for the shares shown. The authors argue that a premium on A-shares (listed on the Mainland) represents the ability of insiders to extract value from investors. Thus, in Hong Kong as a better market, investors would pay a lower price and expect the share price appreciation shown. Source: Guo et al. (2007) .
In theory, Chinese companies benefiting from adopting the corporate governance canon cover a significant part of the economy. Figure 7 shows the industries more likely to profit -and thus import --good corporate governance standards. If Bris et al.'s (2008) study still reflects the current situation among Chinese firms, roughly 11 out of 30 industries can expect to adopt market valuation increasing corporate governance practices.
7 These eleven sectors appear relatively specific (specialised). One might thus hypothesize that managers can adopt profitenhancing corporate governance reforms in easily managed sectors only. Yet, corporate governance looks particularly pressing for some sectors. The real estate, IT and retail sectors affect China's broader macroeconomic stability and growth. The figure shows the industries for which Tobin's q statistically significantly changed due to differences in shareholder protection or accounting standards between China and another jurisdiction from which target firms hail during an M&A. The authors argue that importing corporate governance policies and practices causes these changes in market valuations. Source: Bris et al. (2008) at table 8.
Yet, we do not seem to know why. Few studies find evidence of "bonding" (or Chinese firms adopting corporate governance standards when they list and work abroad). Dong and Xue (2009) test the extent of such bonding, looking at the extent to which corporate governance related variables (like board size, compensation and other factors) statistically significant differ between Chinese firms listed in Shanghai/Shenzhen, in Hong Kong or in New York. They find some factors, like the salaries of the top three board members, and local demand conditions, and all kinds of public disclosure statistically significant differ for firms choosing to list on different exchanges (Ibid , Table 3 ). Yet, factors like board sizes or the proportion of independent directors do not differ -putting into doubt the extent of such bonding. Authors like Clarke (2015) write even more sceptically about bonding. He argues moreover that whether Chinese firms "bond" to foreign corporate governance requirements and values, such rules would not protect investors any more than rules at home in China. Consequently, any share price premium paid by investors comes from their misplaced belief in the likely success of legal action should these Mainland listed companies run into difficulties. Grove and Clouse (2013) Maybe only the indirect effects of better corporate governance rules help improve market discipline -and thus owners'/managers' incentives to maximise shareholder value? We have shown above that better corporate governance's direct effects do not seem to improve shareholder value. What about corporate governance's indirect effects -encouraging transparency and disclosure needed for investors to price and trade Chinese firms' shares accurately?
9 If Hong Kong's corporate governance rules reduce information asymmetries between investors and insiders, share prices should better reflect such firm-specific information.
10 Yet, Figure 8 very much casts doubts on the extent to which better corporate governance leads to more informative share prices (which reflect firm-specific, rather than general market-related, news). Hong Kong share turn-over of Mainland companies does increase, relative to Mainland share turnover for cross-listed shares, in response to firm-specific events (news). Yet, adoption of the practices usually considered as part of good corporate governance fail to make share prices in Hong Kong more responsive to firm-specific news. Such irrelevant factors include institutional ownership, independent directors, and even lack of shareholder concentration. Simply listing in Hong Kong does not guarantee that Mainland companies receive the benefits of (or discipline from) better corporate governance. Not significant variables: Percent of shares held by domestic funds, the ratio of H-shares to A-shares, the number of QFII investors among the top 10 shareholders, the number of board-level directors, percent of independent nonexecutive directors, the number of members of supervisory boards, CEO pay, use of shares to incentivise CEOs, Tobin's q , and the number of foreign subsidiaries.
The figure show s the extent to w hich each of the factors show n affects the extent to w hich share price changes reflect company-specific information (commonly know n as a share's synchonicity). We show the inverse of the authors' regression parameter estimates in order to make firm-specific factors score higher in the figure. We w orry about the large number of factors Typically associated w ith classical corporate governance w hich turn up as insignificant in this study. The authors' application of incorrect econometric techniques most likely explain these results. Source: Li et al. (2014) .
The recent bout of Mainland company fraud involving foreign listings as well as domestically listed firms strongly suggests that foreign listings, and their supposedly stricter corporate governance rules, do not lead to better governed Mainland firms. 11 Figure 9 shows how fraud has 9 In this context, "accurately" refers to investors' ability to observe information signalling likely mismanagement, self-dealing, and other problems. 10 As in the previous sentence, we do not explicitly define our terms (in this case "information asymmetry") as managers and owners knowing about their own self-serving, neglect, fraud or even excessive risks which investors can not properly value. Without abandoning our scientific precision, we can not accurately describe every concept in several sentence. Otherwise, readers would be unable to read such dense and long-winded writing. 11 We talked above about the effect of fraud in general. We now focus on their effect specifically on foreign listingas the topic of this part of this paper and as a led-in to the next section.
significantly reduced market valuations of Mainland shares listed abroad -as reflected in several FTSE (2016) indices. Shares of Chinese companies listed on the Mainland (A shares in particular) have yielded positive returns since 2011. Yet, a recent correction has shown that these previous gains did not reflect knowledge about frauds going on at the time (Yu, 2016) . The prices of Mainland shares listed and traded in the US -and particularly Singapore --have seen the largest declines. 12 High levels of demand in Hong Kong for Chinese shares explain why share prices have not fallen as rapidly on the Hong Kong bourse. Fraud contributed to the large sell-off of securities in the US -with about 1/3 of all Chinese companies listed in the US had financial scandals.
13 Indeed, the lower part of Figure 9 shows that the sell-off centred on small cap shares (whose companies have the weakest corporate governance) the heaviest. Some Mainland companies look toward listing "transfers." These transfers entail Chinese companies' delisting in the US or other foreign markets in order to relist at home in China (Gu, 2016) . Some companies probably seek to cash-in on the fraud and run away before news of such fraud catches up with their share prices. Others seek to avoid the extra scrutiny. Yet, these companies will not represent the bulk which try to maximise profits over the longer term -many by adopting the corporate governance canon. 
Market Caps of Offshore Listed Chinese Com panies Dives as Fraud Scandals Multiply
Source: Cogman and Orr (2013) 12 S-shares receive very little analysis in the English language press and among English-language academics. Thus, we can not speculate about the reasons for the S-share's price changes in Singapore. 13 Beatty and co-authors (2013) provide a superlative account of these frauds as well as related econometric analysis. Ang and co-authors provide the 1/3 figure, and other in-depth facts about these frauds.
The Effect of "Importing" Corporate Governance Rules
What does the experience of Chinese companies, which have actually improved their corporate governance while listed in the US (and other countries), tell us about the corporate governance's effects on profits and returns? Figure 10 shows the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the market premia of various types of firms. 14 The positive effects on foreign firms seem to exceed those of all firms analysed as a single group. Only small foreign firms seem to gain less market valuation relative to large foreign firms -an effect we already saw in the case of Mainland listings (due to fraud risk). How did particular aspects of these firms' corporate governance influence the excess returns accruing to these firms after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? The figure also shows that, for the whole lot of firms, factors like having an independent nominating committee, independent audit committee, having a CEO which does not serve as chairperson, low inside share ownership, high institutional share ownership, low audit fees as share of total assets, and low market capitalisation all lead to large post-Sarbanes Oxley effects on extra (abnormal) returns. Yet, among foreign firms, only the corporate governance factor of having an independent nominating committee seemed to boost these excess returns. These results thus suggest that corporate governance regulatory reform would likely help even those Chinese companies that have not embarked on their own corporate governance reforms. 
Effect of Corporate governance variables on foreign companies
Significant: independent nominating committee*, independent audit committee, CEO doesn't serve as chairperson, inside share ow nership, institutuional share ow nership, audit fees as share of total assets, and market capitalisation*. Not Significant: board independence, independent compensation committee, discloses off-balance sheet information, discloses audit fee information, debt-to-equity ratio, EBIT-to-total assets, and revenue grow th rate. * marks significant variables for foreign-only sample.
The figure show s the estimated returns for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the types of firms show n. The bars show the excess return, return above the risk-free rate, differences in returns betw een small and large companies, and differences in returns betw een value and grow th stocks/companies. We show the corporate governance effects the authors found for all companies -w ith asterisks denoting significant variables for foreign firms only. Source: Sw itzer and Lin (2007) at Table 3 and Table 11 .
Other data seem to support the view that stronger corporate governance regulations could benefit Mainland (and other foreign) firms. Figure 11 shows the gain in abnormal returns and decreased delistings for non-US firms listed in the US as a result of the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 16 In summary, the authors find that foreign companies listed in the US most benefited from Sarbanes-Oxley when they come from jurisdictions with moderate accounting standards and shareholder protection. To put their findings colloquially, foreign firms "bond" (adapt more stringent corporate governance policies) when coming from jurisdictions with Goldilocks corporate governance --not too bad and not too good.
17 Looking specifically at the way Sarbanes-Oxley impacted on company risks, Litvak (2014) finds that a similar Goldilocks phenomenon. High risk foreign firms' risks fell after the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. However, their market valuations also fell. Only large companies from poorer jurisdictions complied with the Act -whereas all companies seemed to comply from other jurisdictions. These result thus point to a kind of reform momentum, whose history makes clear the reasons and targets of such reform . Once Chinese (and other foreign) firms start their corporate governance reform, such reform creates the impetus for more reform -facilitating further reforms (Peng and Blevins, 2014) . Not to belabour the point, but other evidence suggests that adopting the corporate governance canon would even help improve corporate governance in the areas these companies are based in and work in. Figure 12 shows the relationship between the percent of Chinese companies listing abroad from a particular Chinese city or region and the quality of local institutions in that area. Just by eye-balling the data, we can see that more companies from places with higher institutional quality list abroad more often. Thus these companies can, and do, conform with these foreign exchanges' more stringent corporate governance rules. Yet, within each grouping of places (by institutional quality), we see that Chinese firms from places with worse lower institutions (relative to similar regions) tend to list abroad more often. 18 Such a propensity suggests that Mainland firms use foreign listings as a way to import standards needed to compete with peers who work in better institutional environments. The canon helps improve the governance environment as much "around" the company (in its stakeholder entities) as in the company. Broadly speaking, companies w ith better local institutions pref er to list in high quality regulated exchanges. Yet, w ithin the tw o broad groups of provinces, better local institutions can correlate w ith more local listings. Thus, after provinces reach a "quanta" of institutional quality, they pref er to compete w ith the big boys. The outliers though put this hypothesis into doubt. Source: Hornstein (2013) and World Bank (2016) .
18 In order to keep this paper readable, we do not yet again provide the definition of institutions (or institutional quality). Readers should see the original study for more details.
Regulations requiring greater disclosure not only benefit the companies themselves, but also the business environment in which they work. 19 Authors like Laurence (2013) find that both individual and institutional investors actually do trade on the information disclosed. Chen et al. (2014) go further, looking at the extent to which poor disclosure and other corporate governance practices correlate with mis-investment (namely under or over investment as assessed by past, present and future revenues). As shown in Figure 13 , alone, disclosure does not have a statistically significant effect on over or under-investment. Yet, disclosure does affect Mainland companies' corporate governance -which in turn affects investment. 20 Increased disclosure when combined with better corporate governance seems to reduce over-investment -if increasing under-investment. Looking at the effects in well-governed Chinese firms shows a total decrease in investment inefficiency (namely the extent to which these firms over or under-invest). Market characteristics seem to have only microscopic effects on the extent of disclosure. Firms will disclose more before attracting external finance and when returns to assets rise. Disclosure decreases when market valuations increase and when a firm's management has more political connections. The figure show s the regression coefficients trying to explain contributions to Mainland firms' under-investment and over-investment decisions. The authors find that disclosure itself has little effect. Yet, such disclosures combine w ith corporate governance practices to explain such "misinvestment." Tjhe left most part of the figure show s the estimates for over-investment (in black) and under-investment (in red). The middle part show s the effect of these variables on misinvestment (either under or over) for companies strong corporate governance. The right most part of the figure show s the factors correlating w ith more disclosure. The tiny magnitude of these estimates implies very little actual effect. Source: Chen et al. (2015) .
Stronger Hong Kong rules on disclosure could encourage Mainland firms to engage more profitable disclosure. Figure 14 shows the disclosure-producing effects of a foreign listing on Mainland firms. Market valuations rise when Mainland companies disclose abroad -presumably because foreign investors and stakeholders can act more effectively on these disclosures than those inside China. Probabilities of increased disclosure (including voluntary disclosure) jump very significantly when these Mainland firms list overseas. For authors like Xi and Yang (2016) , increased disclosure builds constituencies for further disclosure -as the earnings quality improves as well as shareholder/analyst demand for disclosures increase. For authors like Myers and Steckman (2014) , increased transparency and disclosure serve to make Mainland corporate governance more self-enforcing. Thus, once such disclosure gains momentum in a place like Hong Kong, further transparency looks more likely. (Hail and Leuz, 2008) . Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) find that Sarbanes-Oxley did not distort foreigners' incentives to list on foreign markets. 21 Instead, worse governed companies had to delist (or face the extra compliance costs) -thereby improving market quality and shareholder protection for all listed companies. 22 Of course, as Wintoki (2007) and Grinstein & Chhaochharia (2007) show, not all companies -and especially small firms --should have the same stringent corpora governance requirements. Engel et al. (2007) , using relatively old data whose conclusions still apply to today's situation, find that companies with more insider (managers'/directors') shareholding delisted much more than those with more dispersed shareholding. They further find that the abnormal returns to insider controlled companies which delisted around the time of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's adoption exceeded those of their control group by 6%. te 23 Evidence from Belgium shows that the Act had the effect of actually the improving corporate governance of US listed overseas companies -by causing decreases in earnings management, and thus likely other kinds of accounting manipulation (Dutillieux and Willenkens, 2009 ). As such, it looks like stricter corporate governance rules improve investment returns, even if these policies decrease the discretionary influence of insider managers and directors. But we just do not know... and we spent 15 pages proving it.
Effects of Corporate Governance Changes on Hong Kong Listed Chinese Firms
What effect would adopting the corporate governance canon -represented by Hong Kong's better corporate governance policies and practices --have on foreign and particularly Mainland firms? Hong Kong-listed Mainland companies' share price changes might provide some clue. The last major revisions to Hong Kong's code of corporate governance occurred in 2011. 24 The easiest way of guessing what the effects the revision of Hong Kong's code of corporate governance on Mainland firms had consists of looking at the differences-in-differences of their share prices (as described in detail in the Appendix). Namely, we looked at the difference in share prices for Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong from January 2011 to December 2012. Share prices from for Hong Kong firms listed on the Hong Kong stock market increased on average by 20% at a time when Mainland shares on the Hong Kong stock market fell by 11%.
25
The 11% fall in Mainland companies' shares listed on the Hong Kong stock market partly explains that drop in the overall market index. Yet, such a drop pales in comparison to the 33% drop in the overall Mainland share price index (World Bank, 2016b) . 26 The difference between Hong Kong and Mainland firms' difference in share prices from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2012 thus comes to around 31%. Such a difference comes from the company-specific and policy-specific differences between Hong Kong and Mainland firms. Mainland firms listing in Hong Kong thus saved 22% in losses -an effect we might call a Hong Kong listing effect. At that same time, Mainland firms experienced the changing corporate governance rules at a time when other companies around the world did not. These other companies share prices in the global S&P index fell by 15%. Thus, the specific effect of the corporate governance changes on Mainland firms -after removing market specific effects -comes to 7%. If the differences-indifferences methodology removed other effects, revisions to Hong Kong's code of corporate governance should have cased a 7% lift in Mainland share prices.
Extending on this logic, we can derive the value of corporate governance reforms on Mainland companies' market capitalisation. As we reported earlier, Mainland firms had a market capitalization of $8.2 trillion and better corporate governance has the potential to add another 7% in share value. We can not know the extent to which the Mainland government's own efforts at corporate governance reform will increase share price valuations. If we assume that existing and planned corporate governance reform on the Mainland will translate into increases in market value of 3%, then the remaining 4% increase (times 8.2 trillion) equals roughly $330 billion. Thus, radical changes to Hong Kong's corporate governance rules could increase market capitalizations on the Mainland by around $330 billion by the time their effects work through these companies.
Changes to corporate governance rules would also affect these firms' riskiness and the distribution of share price gains between Mainland firms. Figure 15 shows the spread in share prices for Hong Kong listed firms' share prices in 2011 and in 2013. We have matched these 24 The HKICPA (2012) provides the background and content of that reform. As noted by the Hong Kong Exchange (2010), the Exchange started consultations on reforming the corporate governance code in 2010, with implementation carrying on in 2012. 25 Such an increase occurred against the backdrop of a 5.4% drop in the S&P Global Market Index tracking Hong Kong (as reported by the World Bank, 2016) . 26 As we only want ball-park estimates for this paper, we do not disaggregate the Chinese markets into specific exchanges -like the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges. price distributions to the closest fitting statistical distribution for these price changes (a log logistic curve). As shown, share prices between listed firms tightened after the code of corporate governance revisions. Such share price convergence should not surprise us --as the expanded and standardized corporate governance regulations probably had the effect of reducing the variability of firm-specific differences in the governance practices which reflected on their share prices. Figure 16 though shows the dark side of such reforms. Compared with share price changes around the world, the share prices of many Mainland firms listed in Hong Kong dropped significantly. If we fit the tightest statistical distribution possible on the data, the resulting average price drop came out to around 20% more than world equity prices fell. Yet, when we take into account the larger share price gains of some companies (by fitting a normal distribution to the data), overall share prices rose by 7%. These data confirm a trend repeated by so many corporate governance researchers. Corporate governance reform may increase share price values in the longer-run, even if many companies lose in the short-run.
27
27 Claessens (2006) as well as Black and co-authors (2008) might explain such dynamics due to short-term resistance by the entrenched owners and managers whose interests corporate governance reform may threaten. Indeed, commentators like Crawford (2009) note that corporate governance reform's whole purpose consists of getting managers to focus on the longer-term. Naturally, any one using these simple estimates should use a bit of common sense. These results capture any Hong Kong-specific effect...not just the effect of its corporate governance and corporate governance rules. The size of equity available, slight differences in rules like shorting shares, and even cultural factors may account for some of this 7%. Yet, given investors' ability to arbitrate these differences away -for example they can find deeper markets with similar shorting rules elsewhere in the world). We could have repeated this exercise with these companies listed in other jurisdictions as well (most of the literature we report on looks at US listings). Stripping out the effect of information flows, home market effects (market conditions in China), and regulation on these markets, the results would remain the same.
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Conclusions
We spent a long time looking at the fancier studies trying to figure out if corporate governance changes along the line of "the canon" results in higher shareholder returns. The canon represents the practices encouraged by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and largely adopted (but not on a one-to-one or perfect basis) the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's Listing Rules. Once we remove the regressions and other theory-laden approaches, we find that a simple differencesin-differences approach yields an estimated 7% gain in shareholder returns for Mainland companies adopting Hong Kong's corporate governance practices (and other features unique to a Hong Kong listing). Using the simplest method available (simply calculating a 7% bump to all Mainland companies' valuations), adopting the canon would generate $330 billion around 2016-17. 29 Looking at the way the way the distribution of shareholder returns differs before and after reform shows a proportion of firms' shareholder value declining. Yet, the overall (average) increase more than offsets these losses -suggesting that the canon does not help all companies. Further research could usefully identify which companies such reform would hurt...and why.
